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of the European Parliament (Berthold Rittberger) and 
the new Citizens Direct Legislative Initiative (Carlos 
Closa Montero) as well as the overall impact of the 
Lisbon Treaty on Europarties (Luciano Bardi) . Chang-
es in executive- legislative relations deriving from the 
newly created leadership roles were discussed in a 
broad sense (Amie Kreppel) and with a focus on little 
visible, but important changes in the comitology sys-
tem (Adrienne Héritier).  Finally the discussion turned 
to broader policy areas, i.e. EU foreign policy making 
and its compoundedness (Sergio Fabbrini) and its im-
plications for the Transatlantic relations (Erik Jones). 
Adrienne Héritier
Florence, May 2010
FROM THE CHAIR
 The latest meeting of the Executive Commit-
tee of EUSA was hosted by the Robert Schuman Cen-
ter of the European University Institute in Florence on 
April 16/17. Bravely facing the risk of potential travel 
disruptions due to volcanic ash, several members of 
the Executive Committee ventured across the Atlan-
tic to discuss important EUSA business in Tuscany. 
At the top of the agenda were the preparations for 
the biennial EUSA conference to be held in Boston 
in March 2011. We defined the thematic sections and 
discussed possible program chairs for the panels of 
each section. As in past conferences the spectrum of 
themes to be covered will be very wide ranging from 
Law, Public Policy and Regulation, Political Sociology, 
Political Behavior and Electoral Studies, to Economics 
and Political Economy, Institutions to External Rela-
tions. The Executive Committee also discussed other 
important issues such as the prizes to be awarded at 
the conference in Boston. It unanimously decided to 
award the life-time award for research on the Euro-
pean Union to Jeremy Richardson formerly University 
of Oxford, now University of Canterbury New Zealand, 
who - with his work on the European policy making 
process and the creation of an important venue for 
the publishing of articles on the European Union, the 
Journal of European Public Policy, has greatly contrib-
uted to the advancement of the research on the Euro-
pean Union. The award conferral ceremony will take 
place at the EUSA conference in Boston next year. 
 The session of the Executive Committee was 
followed by a very special event, a joint conference of 
EUSA and ECPR (European Consortium of Political 
Research), the first joint conference ever, hopefully 
marking the beginning of a long-term cooperation be-
tween EUSA and ECPR which will, for instance, take the 
form of having panels at the mutual large conferences.
 The joint conference focused on the imple-
mentation of the Lisbon Treaty. The presentations by 
Wolfgang Wessel, Dan Kelemen, Berthold Rittberger, 
Luciano Bardi, Carlos Closa Montero, Amie Kreppel, 
Adrienne Héritier, Sergio Fabbrini and Erik Jones 
were discussed by Miguel Poiares Maduro, Peter 
Mair, Paolo Ponzano and Pascal Vennesson. They 
addressed matters regarding the strengthened lead-
ership of the European Council (Wolfgang Wessel), 
the risk of institutional pathologies resulting from the 
institutional changes of overlapping new and old lead-
ership roles (Dan Kelemen), then turned to aspects 
of democratic legitimation, i.e. the strengthened role 
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The European Union in a Globalizing World
Living in a Material World: A Critique of 
“Normative Power Europe”
Mark A. Pollack
 There is, in contemporary literature on Euro-
pean Union foreign policy, a broad consensus that 
the EU today constitutes a “normative power.”  As 
first articulated by Ian Manners (2002) in an extraor-
dinarily influential article, the idea of “normative power 
Europe” (NPE) combines two fundamental claims.
 The first of these claims is about the EU’s “nor-
mative difference,” the notion that the EU, by virtue of 
its history, its nature as a hybrid polity, and its politi-
cal and legal framework, is constituted by a commit-
ment to certain constitutional norms that determine its 
international identity (Manners 2002: 241).  Reading 
through a series of historic declarations, policies and 
treaties, Manners identifies five core norms (peace, 
liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights) 
and four minor norms (social solidarity, anti-discrim-
ination, sustainable development, and good gover-
nance) which together constitute the EU’s normative 
identity (Manners 2002: 242).  These are not simply 
universal or Western norms, Manners, argues; rather, 
“the EU is normatively different to other polities with 
its commitment to universal rights and principles” 
(Manners 2002: 241).  Indeed, “in my formulation 
the central component of normative power Europe is 
that it exists as being different to pre-existing political 
forms, and that this particular difference pre-disposes 
it to act in a normative way” (Manners 2002: 242).
 Manners’ second claim is about the nature of 
the EU’s “normative power.”  After reviewing traditional 
views of Europe as a “civilian power” wielding mate-
rial economic resources, and contemporary views of 
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) wield-
ing military power, Manners suggests that these views 
need to be augmented by a consideration of Europe’s 
normative power – a “power of opinion,” “idée force,” or 
the ability to shape conceptions of “normal” in world af-
fairs (Manners 2002: 239).  More specifically, Manners 
identifies six “factors” or mechanisms of norm diffusion, 
which he refers to as contagion, informational diffusion, 
procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion, and 
a “cultural filter” (Manners 2002: 244-45).  While not 
rejecting entirely the significance of material economic 
and political power, Manners argues that, “the ability to 
define what passes for ‘normal’ in world politics is, ulti-
mately, the greatest power of all” (Manners 2002: 253). 
 In the language of rational-choice theories such 
as intergovernmentalism, institutionalism and realism, 
NPE proposes a new and novel explanation of both 
the preferences and the power of the European Union 
in world affairs – the former generated by constitutive 
norms and the latter driven primarily by symbolic and 
ideational processes rather than by material resources.
 There is something veryowerful in this formula-
tion. There can be little doubt that, with respect to human 
rights, the death penalty, multilateralism and the rule of 
law, European leaders see and present themselves as 
driven by sincere normative convictions in their interac-
tions with the rest of the world. As Manners rightly point-
ed out, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain 
EU policies on an issue like the death penalty through 
any appeal to the material interests of the member 
states, and the notion of the EU as a normative power 
has precipitated a series of books, articles and edited 
volumes in recent years (see e.g. Lucarelli, ed., 2007; 
Aggestam 2008; Laïdi 2008; and Tocci, ed., 2008). 
 Beyond the academy, NPE has arguably 
penetrated the thinking of EU practitioners more ef-
fectively than any theoretical concept since Haas’ 
neofunctionalist ideas about spillover, Commission 
entrepreneurship, and upgrading the common inter-
est.  Whether this influence is due to the accuracy of 
its claims, or the heroic light in which it paints the EU 
and its leaders, however, remains an open question. 
 And, just as intergovernmentalists (Moravc-
sik 1998) and historians  (Milward 2000) eventually 
questioned the heroic narrative of neofunctionalist in-
tegration theory, contemporary students of EU foreign 
policy have begun to question Manners’ heroic depic-
tion of the Union as an inherently normative power, 
pure in motivation and noncoercive in its behavior. 
Across a range of issue-areas frequently considered 
to be “normative” in character, these scholars sug-
gest that material interests, and material power re-
sources, are at least as significant as normative ones. 
Preferences
 With respect to preferences, a growing body 
of scholarship challenges, or at least lends nuance 
to, Manners’ portrayal of the EU as an actor driven 
by normative considerations.  Manners, in his original 
statement, simply accepts at face value the various 
declarations, policies and treaties that spell out the 
EU’s core normative principles – a surprisingly uncriti-
cal approach for a critical theorist to take.  And his illus-
trative case study of the EU’s global campaign against 
the death penalty emerges as an “easy” case – one in 
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which no EU member state appeared to have a dis-
cernible material interest that might cut against or un-
dermine the Union’s collective normative commitment.
 By contrast, other recent scholarship sug-
gests either that material interests may underlie the 
EU’s normative declarations (thus rendering latter 
epiphenomenal), or that EU normative and material 
concerns may intermingle in determining EU prefer-
ences (the notion of “mixed motives”), or alternatively 
that material interests may cut across and undermine 
the EU’s public normative stance (hence generating 
charges of hypocrisy; see e.g. Aggestam 2008: 7). 
 Claims that the EU’s normative preferences 
are in fact epiphenomenal to its material interests are 
commonplace among the Union’s conservative critics, 
who question the source and the sincerity of the EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism and the rule of interna-
tional law.  Robert Kagan, for example, has famously 
suggested that the EU’s embrace of such principles 
actually reflects an effort to compensate for Europe’s 
military weakness and tie down a hegemonic United 
States (Kagan 2002).  Others, like Jack Goldsmith 
and Eric Posner, suggest that the EU’s commitment 
to the rule of law and multilateralism is insincere, as 
witnessed by the Union’s willingness to violate inter-
national law and engage in serial bilateralism where 
doing so will serve its material interests (Goldsmith 
and Posner 2009).  Such accounts serve a useful pur-
pose in questioning the purity of the EU’s motives, but 
they almost certainly go too far in reducing the EU’s 
normative beliefs to hidden material preferences.
 More convincing, in this context, are other 
studies that demonstrate mixed motives in the EU’s 
“normative” foreign policies.  In their study of the EU’s 
environmental diplomacy, for example, R. Daniel Kele-
men and David Vogel (2009) suggest that, while the 
EU’s global environmental leadership is consistent 
with EU norms such as multilateralism and sustain-
able development, a pure NPE approach pays inad-
equate attention to the role of economic interests.  In 
their alternative, “regulatory politics” approach, the EU 
has sought to export or upload its high environmental 
standards, not simply out of normative concern for the 
global environment, but at least in part in an effort to 
level the economic playing field vis-à-vis states with 
more lax economic standards.  Indeed, the EU’s en-
vironmental diplomacy is just one part of a broader 
Commission initiative to “promot[e] European stan-
dards internationally through international organiza-
tion and bilateral agreements,” which, the Commis-
sion argues, “works to the advantage of those already 
geared up to meet those standards” (European Com-
mission quoted in Pollack and Shaffer 2009: 129). 
 Other case studies point to areas in which the 
EU’s normative declarations may come into conflict 
with the material interests of EU member govern-
ments and their constituents.  Camille Webber (2010), 
for example, examines the EU’s establishment of 
codes of conduct for arms trading with third countries, 
suggesting that, while a normative concern with con-
flict prevention may have been a partial motivation for 
the establishment of such codes, the large material 
interests of arms exporters in the various EU member 
states has resulted in provisions that are often politi-
cally rather than legally binding, and sufficiently vague 
as to impose few significant restrictions on such sales. 
Karen Smith (2001) makes a similar case about EU 
inconsistency in its promotion of human rights norms 
vis-à-vis economically or strategically important states 
like Russia and China.  Perhaps the most obvious 
case of EU hypocrisy, in which economic interests 
trump normative declarations, is the area of trade pol-
icy.  Here, notwithstanding admirable normatively mo-
tivated efforts like the “Everything but Arms” initiative, 
the Union’s defense of the protectionist Common Ag-
ricultural Policy stands as a significant global impedi-
ment to economic development in the world’s poor-
est nations, with external US and WTO pressures and 
budgetary ceilings, rather than normative concerns, 
explaining the modest reforms undertaken over the 
past several decades (Oxfam 2003, Matthews 2008). 
Power
 Even if one concedes that the EU’s goals are 
motivated exclusively by normative ends, there re-
mains the question whether the means or sources of 
EU power are normative, material, or – as seems like-
ly – some combination of the two.  To his credit, Man-
ners did not argue that EU power arose solely through 
ideational processes – and a careful reading of Man-
ners’ six “factors” reveals a mix of ideational process-
es and hard economic and institutional conditional-
ity as potential mechanisms of normative diffusion. 
 Indeed, the significance of material power in 
diffusing EU norms is at the center of two of the most 
important research programs in EU studies over the 
past decade.  The first of these, on EU enlargement 
and its effects on candidate countries, has produced a 
sprawling literature, much of which points to the cen-
trality of material power and economic conditionality. 
In the most systematic multi-author study, for example, 
Ulrich Sedelmeier and Frank Schimmelfennig (2005: 
210-11) find some evidence for normative influence 
through lesson-drawing and socialization, but conclude 
that, on balance, “the external incentives provided by 
the EU can largely account for the impact of the EU 
on candidate countries,” and other landmark studies 
similarly point to economic conditionality as providing 
the best explanation for the timing and the substance 
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of EU normative diffusion to candidate countries 
(see also Vachudova 2005, Zürn and Checkel 2005). 
 A second research program, on the EU and 
global human rights, similarly points to the importance 
of material pressure and economic conditionality in se-
curing implementation of human rights norms in third 
countries.  In a series of publications, for example, 
Emilie Hafner-Burton examines the EU’s growing use 
of human rights conditionality in its preferential trad-
ing agreements and demonstrates that only such hard 
incentives show a statistically significant correlation 
with human rights performance in third countries (Haf-
ner-Burton 2005, 2009).  By contrast, a recent study 
of EU human rights diplomacy in the United Nations 
system demonstrates declining support for EU posi-
tions in the UN General Assembly, the Security Coun-
cil, and the Human Rights Council, where the EU has 
increasingly lost ground to defenders of national sov-
ereignty like Russia and China, despite the impres-
sively unanimous and impassioned advocacy of the 
Union and its members (Gowan and Brandtner 2008). 
 Indeed, surveying the EU’s human rights and 
environmental foreign policies in recent years, it is hard 
not to conclude that the EU foreign-policy practitioners 
have drunk the NPE Kool-Aid, believing that the force 
of the EU’s normative example really could change 
the world, uncoupled from the EU’s material sources 
of bargaining leverage.  That view has served the EU 
poorly in the UN human rights realm, and condemned 
the Union to near-irrelevance at the Copenhagen cli-
mate-change negotiations in December 2009.  The 
danger is that, having effectively yielded material con-
ditionality as a positive force for change in the past, 
EU practitioners may mistake the ideal-type image of 
a normative power Europe for an accurate descrip-
tion of the EU’s actual influence in the world – to the 
detriment of the EU and of the causes it advocates.
Bringing the Material Back In
 None of this is to say that the EU is driven ex-
clusively by material concerns, or that declarations 
of normative principles are epiphenomenal conceal-
ments of material economic or geopolitical interests. 
The abhorrence that many Europeans feel for the 
death penalty and for genetically modified foods, and 
their commitment to human rights and sustainable de-
velopment, are real, and not (or not always) reduc-
ible to underlying material interests.  As Adrian Hyde-
Price (2008) has suggested, even a realist account 
can allow for “second-order” normative concerns 
to shape EU foreign policy, particularly when “first-
order” material interests are weak or indeterminate. 
 Nevertheless, it seems as if the romance of 
the NPE image has not only dethroned material inter-
ests from their primacy, but runs the risk of expung-
ing material interests and material power resources 
from our analysis.  To do so, however, would be pro-
foundly unwise, for two reasons.  First, the system-
atic, theoretically derived and empirically grounded 
study of the EU’s material foreign policy interests has 
been one of the greatest achievements of contempo-
rary international political economy (Lake 2008) and 
EU studies (Moravcsik 1998, Fioretos 2011), and ig-
noring these findings would represent the abandon-
ment of one of our most effective social scientific tools. 
 Second, the question of the EU’s normative 
or material preferences, and the normative or mate-
rial means it uses to advance those preferences in the 
world, is ultimately an empirical question, and our theo-
retical framework for studying EU foreign policy should 
not rule in favor of either material or normative factors 
by assumption (Aggestam 2008).  For students of the 
EU, our primary aim as scholars should not be to cel-
ebrate the EU’s moral superiority in an uncritical fash-
ion, but to understand the full range of normative and 
material motivations and power resources that the EU 
brings to bear in shaping the world beyond its borders
Mark A. Pollack, Temple University
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Between Modern Statehood and 
International Organisation: Creeping – Global – 
Constitutionalism?
Antje Wiener
Introduction
 With its notable 2008 ruling in the Kadi Case, 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stepped in to 
protect fundamental rights of individuals against the 
United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) policy of 
smart sanctions.1  As AG Maduro emphasised, “[T]
he claim that a measure is necessary for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security cannot oper-
ate so as to silence the general principles of Commu-
nity law and deprive individuals of their fundamental 
rights.”2  Among other issues, this case emphasises 
the fragility of fundamental rights protection in inter-
national relations. Two aspects are particularly inter-
esting for political scientists. First, it demonstrates the 
accountability problem as international organisations 
directly affect individuals. Second, it sheds light on 
a new practice of non-state actor intervention which 
leaves states, as the erstwhile principals, to one side, 
as their agents engage in constitutional matters. The 
ruling has generated much debate, mainly among Eu-
ropean and international lawyers (De Burca 2009). It 
went relatively unnoticed by political scientists, much 
as many of the earlier landmark rulings of the ECJ 
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(compare e.g. Van Gend & Loos3,  Costa vs. ENEL4). 
 In this brief essay I argue however that it should 
matter as a case which brings the gradual change of 
actorship in international relations to the fore. This 
change includes two aspects. First, as sovereignty is 
disaggregated and non-state actors directly affect indi-
viduals, fundamental rights protection is undermined. 
To counter the effect, new norms and principles have 
been discussed, especially referring to the recent UN 
reform. Second, as treaty-based international organi-
sations adopt powerful decisions non-state actors such 
as the EU and the UN are adopting the power of consti-
tution-based organisations. I call the process creeping 
global constitutionalism and argue that the EU’s expe-
rience with constitution-building over the past five de-
cades offers a reference frame to understand and criti-
cally assess its material and normative potential. The 
following elaborates on this argument based on three 
steps which highlight constitutional quality beyond the 
state, EU constitutionalism and UN constitutionalism.
Constitutional Quality beyond the State 
 Constitutional quality beyond the state typi-
cally clusters around international organisations. It is 
identified by two characteristics. First, it entails for-
mal (hard) institutions and informal (soft) institutions 
which are interlocked through legal instruments, policy 
practices and day-to-day routine. Second, it reveals 
derivates of stateness, even though its organisation-
al roots and normative substance cannot be derived 
from either the modern nation-state or from that of an 
international organisation. Change of this quality is ini-
tiated by international interaction including state and 
non-state actors. It is measured based on textual and 
discourse changes of the involved institutions, trig-
gered by social practices that develop in relation with 
the former. For example, when making public efforts to 
establish legitimacy with regard to fundamental norms 
such as democracy or human rights, even when in 
breach with international law, actors are enacting 
normative “meaning-in-use” (Milliken 1999). Through 
this practice, they sustain or contest normative struc-
tures. Discursive interventions are therefore empiri-
cally accessible indicators of constitutional quality. 
 Enhanced constitutional quality in international 
relations represents a shift from treaty-based towards 
constitution-based international organisations. It plac-
es non-state actors near stateness and raises the 
question of how to deal with derivates of statehood out-
side modern national states. Despite its recent formal 
consolidation as a treaty-based organisation with the 
2009 Lisbon Treaty the EU remains the most common 
example of this shift. Others such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and the United Nations (UN) have 
also undergone changing constitutional quality (Cass 
2001, Cohen 2004). The process represents a poten-
tial power shift from state to non-state actors. For ex-
ample, the EU and the UN’s respective bodies now 
have the power to directly affect individuals, e.g. with 
the UNSC decisions about smart sanctions or with ref-
erence to the responsibility to protect.5  Such direct 
links correspond with political necessity and legal rule. 
They are, therefore, functional for steering purposes 
of global governance in the absence of a global po-
litical community. However, are they also democratic? 
 As international organisations actively par-
take in international decisions their actions matter for 
the re/constitution of global order. Neither world so-
ciety theory nor global governance approaches as 
the leading IR theories in that area are well equipped 
to answer that question. Furthermore, despite opti-
mistic references to ‘politicisation’ and ‘legalisation’ 
as processes that attribute global politics the poten-
tial to counter the accountability problem, functional 
solutions are likely to miss the central importance 
of negotiated normativity. Therefore, studies of con-
stitutional quality beyond the state need to turn to 
constitutional theory. Integration theories including 
politics and law offer helpful guidance in that regard.
EU Constitutionalism
 While formally the post-Lisbon EU seems to 
be slowing down into a relatively settled existence as 
a treaty-based international organisation. However, 
in practice, it is now so advanced in its ways that it 
stands out among international organisations as a val-
ue-based regional order. The EU is sui generis since it 
differs from all other IOs according to its constitutional 
quality. Thus, the hard institutions involve legislative, 
judicative and executive organs, and the soft institu-
tions include core democratic constitutional principles 
of modern statehood such as fundamental rights, de-
mocracy, the rule of law and respect for minority rights. 
Despite publicly voiced suspicion that the Lisbon 
Treaty really is not altogether too far off the original 
constitutional project, the EU is formally established 
as a treaty-based rather than a constitution-based in-
ternational organisation. Nonetheless, the felt consti-
tutional quality of this organisation has been influen-
tial throughout the process of European integration. 
 The practice of referring to fundamental 
rights, especially as expressed through and devel-
oped by the EU courts’ jurisprudence, has been de-
cisive for constituting a layer of constitutional patina 
which does not fit either the organisational practices 
of modern statehood or the organisational practices 
of a treaty-based international organisation consti-
tuted under the rules of international, rather than do-
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mestic law. For example, the fundamental norms of 
sovereignty, fundamental rights and citizenship were 
central to landmark rulings which were instrumental 
to the process of ‘integration through law’ a process 
which was notably kicked-off with Van Gend en Loos 
and continued to shape the specific “Community legal 
order” as autonomous from the domestic law of the 
EU member states and the international legal order. It 
is a legal order in its own right despite being a treaty-
based organisation. This development was sustained 
with the Kadi Case and other landmark rulings that 
matter especially for the reconstitution of sovereignty. 
 As the EU’s is increasingly viewed as a value-
based normative power and political theorists discuss 
the UN’s constitutional options, the EU’s experience 
as constitutional player zooming in on the EU’s experi-
ence offers important insight with regard to two aspects. 
First, the empirical reconstruction of the social practic-
es of constitutionalism helps establishing the difference 
between European and other trajectories, i.e. modern 
or ancient constitutionalism (Tully 1995). Second, as 
a type of constitutionalism that developed in relation 
with modern constitutionalism since the height of mo-
dernity in the mid-twentieth century (Giddens 1985), 
EU constitutionalism thus offers a reference frame for 
other processes of constitutional change such as the 
UN and the WTO. Both are similarly situated in the his-
torical context of late modernity, yet distinct from the 
EU as international organisations with a global rather 
than a regional focus (Dunoff and Trachtman 2009). 
UN Constitutionalism
 While the literature on constitutionalism re-
mains largely unexplored by students of international 
politics, international lawyers and European lawyers 
have cast an attentive eye on the impact of the ex-
panding constitutional quality beyond the state. As the 
Kadi Case demonstrates, the ECJ’s activities are be-
ginning to straddle the line between international and 
domestic law, European constitutionalism emerges as 
a contender of modern constitutionalism (Weiler and 
Wind 2003, Walker and Loughlin 2007). The remain-
der of this section turns to more recent observations 
of constitutionalism within the framework of the UN. 
These discussions have been fuelled by the paradig-
matic shift of international relations from assumptions 
about long-lasting peace in a post cold-war world 
to security threats in the wake of 9/11. Remarkably, 
this shift reflects the enhanced and contested politi-
cal role of the UNSC. This and, relatedly the devel-
opment of UN constitutionalism remain subject to 
debate. What can be established with some convic-
tion, however, is that the UN entered the uncharted 
waters of constitutional quality beyond the state with-
out a safe shore insight. The EU’s experience offers 
a reference frame to establish this position. The fol-
lowing illustrates the value-added of this reference. 
 Two distinct assessments of the UN reform 
stand out. They differ to an extent that one is left won-
dering whether the choice of theoretic tools can lead 
to such strikingly different findings, indeed. While one 
praises the UN reform as quite a decisive step towards 
quality control grounded on a shift from rights-based to 
value-based international relations (Slaughter 2005), 
the other issues a warning considering the very consti-
tutional quality of UN governed international politics as 
a threat to the principle of sovereign equality among 
states as long as the UNSC is not reformed (Cohen 
2008). The question to be raised here for political sci-
entists is (a) whether, how and where constitutionali-
sation of the UN has taken place, and (b) whether it 
should take place, and if so, according to which pa-
rameters. Turning to the EU offers helpful pointers for 
this endeavour. These include most importantly, the 
project of establishing and maintaining democratic le-
gitimacy that remains stable despite unequal power 
relations. To that end, organising principles such as 
the equiprimordiality of constitutionalism and democ-
racy would need to be warranted institutionally prior to 
addressing grundnorm changes of international law.
Conclusion
 EU constitutionalism matters for studying other 
international organisations, not as a blueprint but for 
critical comparative reference. Both the EU and the UN 
are increasingly influential as global actors that do not 
match the treaty-based roles foreseen in their respec-
tive original institutional settings. In light of multiple 
crossings between political, societal and constitutional 
boundaries, it is no longer obvious “whose sovereign-
ty” to take into account to make sure the principles of 
justice and fairness are respected when practicing in-
ternational relations in the 21st century (Cohen 2004). 
Contrary to the popular perception of the EU’s consti-
tutional process, especially its presentation in the me-
dia which would appear to support a normalisation of 
the EU as one among many other international organi-
sations, on a deeper level, the social practices of con-
stitutionalism have been constitutive for a specific type 
of contemporary constitutionalism that is distinctively 
European. Given the process of regional integration 
which has been constitutive for European constitution-
alism, the EU’s experience offers a framework for ad-
dressing enhanced constitutional quality elsewhere.
Antje Wiener, University of Hamburg
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Notes
1 ECJ, Kadi and Al Barakaat, Cases C-402/05P and C415-
/05P, 3 Sep 2008.
 2 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case 
C-402/05 P, 28 January 2008, p. 4 ( http://www.statewatch.
org/news/2008/jan/ecj-kadi-ag-opinion.pdf <accessed 6 
February 2010>
 3 Judgment of the Court, Van Gend & Loos, Case 26_62 
(5 February 1963)
4 Judgement of the Court of 15 July 1964. Flaminio 
Costa v E.N.E.L. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUr......
do?uri=CELEX:61964J0006:EN:NOT
5 Report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS), Ottawa, Canada 2001, 
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf <accessed 
31 March 2010>
 6 Article 6, TEU, now Article 2, Title 1, Lisbon Treaty at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/
st06655.de08.pdf <assessed 6 February 2010> 
7 In a more recent opinion in the Rottmann Case, that 
process was taken further based on the first refer-
ence to a “European citizenship” in addition to Union 
citizenship and national member state citizenship. 
Schlussanträge des GA Maduro, 30 Sept 2009, Re-
chtssache C 135/08 Janko Rottmann gegen Freistaat 
Bayern: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=CELEX:62008C0135:DE:HTML
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Europe’s Quiet Revolution:  Redefining Power in 
the 21st Century
Steven Hill
 The world is facing two immense challenges 
that sometimes get lost amidst all the headlines about 
global recession, Greek default and contagion. First, 
how do we identify the institutions and practices ca-
pable of enacting a decent quality of life for a burgeon-
ing global population of 6.5 billion people? Or to say 
that another way, how do we allow China, India, Brazil 
and other countries to come up in the world, and enjoy 
a similar standard of living enjoyed by the Americans, 
Europeans, Japanese and others; and second, how 
do we do all that in a way that does not burn up the 
planet in a Venus atmosphere of our own creation, 
resulting from excessive carbon emissions, pollution, 
and other downsides of development?  
 Responding to those two challenges is the 
defining task of the 21st century. The pressure is on 
for wealthy, advanced nations like the United States 
and those in Europe to learn to “do more with less.” 
More than anywhere else, Europe has been forging 
the types of innovations that point the way forward for 
the world to meet these challenges. 
 Yet Europe’s evolution as a world leader most-
ly has taken place under the radar, buried under a de-
cades-long dirge of headlines trumpeting its imminent 
demise, the Greece crisis being the latest example. 
Just as the mass media misreported weapons of mass 
destruction and missed an $8 trillion housing bubble, 
it has missed the important story of Europe. Part of 
the misunderstanding stems from the way we define 
“power.” During the U.S.–Soviet superpower tussle 
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compensated, with high salaries and the most gener-
ous social support systems in the world. Americans 
can scarcely imagine a world in which Wal-Mart, GM 
or Microsoft’s board of directors would have anywhere 
from a third to a half of its directors elected directly by 
its workers, or where corporations have to deal with 
works councils and their “co-decision rights.”  Europe, 
in effect, has redesigned the corporation, yet the pop-
ular media is largely unaware of this practice. 
 
Real family values. 
 Europe’s social capitalism is better at support-
ing families and individuals in this increasingly inse-
cure age, providing not only less expensive univer-
sal health care but also a decent retirement, ample 
vacations, paid parental leave, kiddie stipends, paid 
sick leave, affordable child care, free or nearly free 
university education, job training, housing assistance, 
senior care, efficient mass transportation and more. 
Hardly a “welfare state,” Europe’s social capitalism is 
an ingenious “workfare” framework that helps families 
and individuals to stay healthy, productive and working 
during a time of economic crisis.  As a result Europe 
has far less inequality than the United States, and that 
in turn has resulted in lower incidences of other social 
ills such as homicides, people in prison, mental illness 
and level of trust, according to researchers like Rich-
ard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, authors of The Spirit 
Level.  
 Despite this generous support system, alleg-
edly overtaxed Europeans really don’t pay out more 
than Americans.  Americans are paying exorbitantly 
out-of-pocket to receive the services and supports that 
Europeans receive in exchange for their taxes. For ex-
ample, child care in the U.S. costs more than $12,000 
annually for a family with two children. In Europe it 
costs about one-sixth amount (in some countries it’s 
free), and the quality is superior. In the U.S. Social Se-
curity provides only about half the retirement income 
needed, which is why Americans are stuffing as much 
as possible into their IRAs and 401(k)s. But the more 
generous European retirement system provides 75 
percent to 85 percent of retirement income, depend-
ing on the country. Either way, you pay, yet these sorts 
of complexities are not calculated into simplistic analy-
ses like Forbes’ annual Tax Misery Index.
 Moreover, an OECD comparison of tax rates 
shows that average wage earners in the US don’t nec-
essarily pay less in taxes than their counterparts in 
some European countries.  American average wage 
earners pay an “all in” tax burden of 29.4% (“all in” 
includes federal income tax, state or local income tax 
and employee social security contributions). While av-
erage wage earners in Belgium, Sweden, Germany 
of the Cold War, power and leadership were heavily 
dependent on military might. The Bush-Cheney years 
saw an aggressive reassertion of this muscular pos-
ture, and President Barack Obama has continued and 
even extended some of these policies. Yet for all the 
talk of America as the world’s lone remaining super-
power, the events since September 11, 2001, have 
demonstrated the limits of that power. Meanwhile, Eu-
rope’s power and influence have been manifesting in 
myriad ways, some of them traditional and others un-
conventional:
Economic strength. 
 The European Union has become the largest, 
wealthiest trading bloc in the world, and with the in-
clusion of Norway and Switzerland produces nearly a 
third of the world’s economy – nearly as large as the 
U.S. and China combined. Europe has more Fortune 
500 companies than the U.S. and China together, as 
well as more small businesses than the U.S. that pro-
duce two-thirds of the jobs, compared to half the jobs 
in the U.S. Europe also has some of the most com-
petitive national economies in the world, according to 
the World Economic Forum, and is the largest trad-
ing partner with both the U.S. and China. Currently it 
even has a slightly lower rate of unemployment than 
the U.S. This is hardly socialism, as some have main-
tained, but rather it is a different form of capitalism than 
the type seen in the United States – social capitalism 
vs. Wall Street capitalism. Broadly speaking, Europe 
has figured out how to harness capitalism’s tremen-
dous wealth-generating capacity so that its prosperity 
is more broadly shared than in the U.S. And because 
Europe has learned to do more with less and is better 
at spreading its prosperity around than “trickle down” 
America, it hasn’t needed U.S. or Chinese-like roaring 
economic growth rates, a lower “steady state” growth 
rate has been sufficient.
Economic democracy. 
 Key to Europe’s harnessing of capitalism has 
been the widespread use of practices like codetermi-
nation, works councils, co-operatives, public-private 
partnerships and a vibrant small-business sector, 
which, in aggregate, are fostering a degree of econom-
ic democracy and decentralization. Codetermination’s 
framework, requiring worker-elected representatives 
sitting side by side with stockholder representatives 
on corporate boards of directors, and works councils 
in most workplaces, has fostered a “culture of consul-
tation” that has resulted in workers having input, even 
into important decisions.  That’s been a win-win, as 
businesses have been less plagued by labor strife and 
internal schisms, and workers are comparatively well 
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and the Netherlands pay a marginal “all in” tax rate of 
anywhere from 44% to 55%, Ireland and Switzerland’s 
tax rate actually is lower than in the US, at 26% and 
28.7%.  Tax rates in the UK and Spain are not much 
higher, and even France’s rate is only 31.7% for an av-
erage wage earner. Which is rather remarkable, con-
sidering how much more the French, Swiss, Brits and 
others get for their taxes compared to Americans.
 
Readying for global warming. 
 Europe is the leading innovator in preparing for 
global warming, with widespread deployment of con-
servation practices and “green design” in buildings, as 
well as renewable energy technologies like solar, wind 
and sea power, more widely available mass transit, 
higher fuel efficiency in automobiles, and more. Con-
sequently, Europe’s ecological “footprint” (the amount 
of the earth’s capacity that a population consumes) is 
half that of the United States for the same standard 
of living; the average American emits twice as much 
carbon as the average European (and four times as 
much as a Chinese person, eight times as much as an 
Indian).  In the process, Europe has launched a green 
industry that has created hundreds of thousands of 
new jobs and is exporting its innovations to the world. 
Obama campaigned on doing this but so far has been 
unable to move forward much due to needing 60 out 
of 100 votes in a filibuster-gone-wild Senate. 
 
Robust democracy. 
 After centuries of kings and dictators, Europe’s 
nations have forged political institutions and electoral 
methods that have produced the most advanced repre-
sentative democracies in the world founded on institu-
tions like proportional representation, public financing 
of campaigns, free media time for parties, and uni-
versal voter registration. These in turn have fostered 
pluralism, participation, multiparty representation and 
consensus policy based on broad public support.  Eu-
rope’s robust political democracies ensure that politics 
rule over economics, instead of the other way around, 
which in turn ensures that the benefits of its prosper-
ous social capitalism are broadly shared.  
 Now Europe is trying to extend its democratic 
traditions to the continental-level via the European 
Union, where results have been more mixed.  But the 
EU is a work in progress; ironically “old Europe” is ac-
tually fairly young with the current configuration of the 
EU dating only to 2004 (by comparison, following the 
inauguration of the first American government in 1790, 
it took approximately 80 years -- and a civil war -- for 
the “United” States to cease being a collection of re-
gions and to forge a national identity).
 
Innovative foreign policy. 
 Europe is transforming our very notions of 
effective power. With America’s “hard power” suffer-
ing setbacks, the European Union’s “smart power” is 
based on regional networks of nations and Europe’s 
own Marshall Plan for development. These “peace and 
prosperity partnerships” among neighboring countries 
has resulted in a “Eurosphere” with some 2 billion peo-
ple -- one third of the world -- linked by trade, aid and 
investment to the E.U.  Moreover, European foreign 
policy is slowly learning to distinguish its interests from 
that of its American partners; contrary to stereotype, 
Europe has the second-largest defense budget in the 
world, spending more than China with more soldiers in 
uniform than the United States.  Europe has two nu-
clear military powers (Britain and France), military jets, 
tanks and other hardware, and peacekeeping troops 
serving in hot spots around the world.  But Europe 
has a different approach than the US about when and 
how to exercise its military option. Europe’s tradition of 
multilateralism, more than America’s unilateralism, is 
fostering the skill set necessary for bringing the world 
together around multiple global challenges.
  Some will object that there is no such thing 
as a “European way,” since Europe is composed of 
numerous individual nations that show differences 
among themselves, and often are plagued by disunity. 
Certainly the Greek debt crisis has re-exposed some 
of these fault lines. But as Sven Steinmo and Jeffrey 
Kopstein have observed, the differences between E.U. 
member nations increasingly are not that much great-
er “than the differences among Alabama, New York 
and Minnesota.” The member states of the E.U. have 
similar approaches to their national economies, health 
care and other workfare supports, energy, transporta-
tion, and democracy. While some European nations 
hew to this “way” more than others, the overall trajec-
tory is unmistakably clear. Certain dominant elements 
and tendencies can be distinguished among all the 
European countries, and the similarities in their basic 
fulcrum institutions compose a European Way that is 
distinct from the American Way.
 Some have predicted that China, by virtue of 
its large population and growing economy, is destined 
to rise to global prominence, perhaps even supplant-
ing America and Europe. But China is still a develop-
ing county with low per capita income, low energy 
productivity, high pollution, and an inefficient economy 
that produces but a fraction of Europe’s or U.S. wealth 
or productive capacity.  With nearly one billion people 
living in poverty, especially in the rural areas, China’s 
“consultative dictatorship” has not demonstrated an 
economic model capable of fostering a middle-class 
quality of life that can work for vast populations of 
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people. China’s growth and evolution since Mao have 
been impressive, yet it remains in essence a subcon-
tractor to the West, wracked by internal contradictions, 
corruption, pollution, and social unrest.  It’s leaders 
lacked the confidence to tolerate even a whisper of 
public reflection or protest during the twenty year an-
niversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown.  It is 
instructive that few people in the world are banging 
down the door to move to China.
 Some will say that the current Greek default 
crisis is evidence of a defect in the E.U. and eurozone 
structures that severely limits its future.  But most of 
the important innovations in Europe have occurred at 
the national level, with the EU only recently contrib-
uting continent-wide directives; Greece’s plight does 
not affect greatly what the national governments have 
forged together.  Its predicament has become a cau-
tionary tale of what can happen if government deficits 
become recklessly overextended, but most European 
governments have not suffered that fate (though Cali-
fornia has -- last summer the Golden State had to is-
sue IOUs to keep from defaulting, even while a quarter 
of Californians have no health insurance).
 While the Greek situation is messy and noisy, 
Europe often has evolved in reaction to such a cri-
sis. During each crisis Euroskeptics have predicted 
the imminent demise of Europe, only to be proven 
wrong. The Greek crisis seems to be spurring Europe 
to fine-tune its vision and its institutions, and ironically 
may end up making it even stronger and more united. 
Previous crises have certainly played that role. No 
question, at times Europe can look quite messy, lurch-
ing from one apparent crisis to another. And it faces 
daunting challenges to integrate its minority popula-
tions, to get more women into the work force and in 
some countries to stabilize their declining populations. 
Yet generally speaking, at the end of the day, Europe 
gets the job done, and that has been the most salient 
feature, the most impressive credential, over the past 
sixty years.
 In short, if Europe didn’t exist we would have to 
invent it.  In this make-or-break century, the European 
Way, combining its unique brand of social capitalism 
with ecological sustainability and regional peace and 
prosperity partnerships, is proposing a quiet revolution 
in human development that has the greatest potential 
to nudge the world forward.
Steven Hill, New America Foundation
Greece’s Debt Crisis: National Failure or 
EU Shortcoming?
Nikolaos Zahariadis
 On September 3, 2009 Greek Prime Minister 
K. Karamanlis called for a snap election halfway into 
his second term. Despite widespread outcry from his 
own party and opinion polls that predicted a loss, he 
insisted this was best for the country. It was certainly 
best for him for the victorious Socialists under G. Pa-
pandreou announced three weeks after their victory 
on October 4 the government’s budget deficit would 
hit 12.5 percent—twice as high as previous estimates. 
Eventually, the country teetered on the brink of bank-
ruptcy crushed by high borrowing costs. Although ini-
tially remote as an option, national default became the 
only way out of the crisis. What happened? Is this the 
result of national failure or the outcome of a flawed EU 
monetary union?
 I argue it is fundamentally an EU shortcoming 
more than a national failure. This does not mean that 
Greece’s profligate spending does not play a major 
role in this tragedy. Rather the point is that viewing it 
simply as a Greek problem that needs to be isolated 
and “corrected,” as many analysts seem to argue, will 
not solve the fundamental issue that belies Europe’s 
predicament. There cannot be successful monetary 
integration without robust movement toward fiscal and 
perhaps political integration.
 The essay is divided in three sections. The 
first traces the beginnings of the crisis and the vari-
ous attempts at defusing it. The second section aims 
to understand the complexity of the issue. It highlights 
the various dimensions by elaborating on two levels: 
the domestic and the EU. Finally, the essay concludes 
with implications for EU policy-making and the painful 
process of European integration.
How did the issue come about?
 For years successive Greek governments 
treated the public sector as property whose purpose 
was to keep them in power. While the issue did not be-
gin with the ascendance of A. Papandreou’s—who was 
the current Prime Minister’s late father—Socialists in 
power, the government’s budget deficit and public debt 
exploded in the 1980s. According to OECD figures, 
the budget deficit increased from less than 3 percent 
in 1981, the year Greece became the 10th member of 
the EC, to 11 percent in 1991 before it went down to 6 
percent in 2001. During the same period, public debt 
EUSA EU Public Policy 
Interest Section
EUSA Review    Spring 2010  13 
rose from roughly 30 percent of GDP to 82.2 percent 
and 114.4 percent respectively (OECD various years). 
Much of the increase in public debt (and the general 
government’s deficit) is attributed to a ballooning pub-
lic sector, generous industrial subsidies, social ben-
efits, and increasing debt service payments. By 2009, 
850,000 people were employed in the public sector in 
a country of 11 million. Most of Greece’s biggest com-
panies are either state-run or state-managed (Tsiantar 
2010, Global 2).
 Since the Socialists’ advent in power for the 
first time in Greece’s post-war history, successive gov-
ernments accused their predecessors of “cooking the 
books” to present a rosy financial picture and gather 
votes. Each government leader promised to take the 
necessary steps to avert economic disaster and put 
the country back on the road to prosperity. This is 
exactly what A. Papandreou (Socialist) said in 1981, 
what K. Mitsotakis (conservative) said in 1990, what 
A. Papandreou (Socialist) said again in 1993, and 
what K. Karamanlis (conservative) said in 2004. It is 
a time-tested strategy to shift the blame to previous 
governments—it’s always their fault—and minimize 
the political cost of taking unpopular decisions. Each 
government then proceeded to do exactly (or worse 
than) what its predecessor did. 
 It is no surprise, therefore, to hear Prime Minis-
ter G. Papandreou sing the same tune. That is exactly 
what his conservative predecessor did to him in 2004 
when the Socialists were voted out of power. How-
ever, two elements make the current crisis a funda-
mentally different case. First, global attention is shift-
ing from the excesses of the private sector and the 
financial meltdown to the excesses of the public sec-
tor (in Greece, the US, and elsewhere). Second, the 
magnitude of data correction and the consequent loss 
of credibility are potentially lethal. The government hid 
additional expenditures of roughly €16 billion in 2009. 
The amount may sound minimal to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense, but to an economy of about €240 
billion with a current public debt level of €290 billion 
(121 percent and climbing) it is quite significant (The 
Economist 2010a).
 As a result, Standard & Poor’s downgraded 
Greece’s sovereign debt to BBB+ on December 17, 
driving up borrowing costs. On January 12, 2010 the 
European Commission formally condemned Greece 
for falsifying data on public finances, causing further 
jitters in an already anxious market. Greece reacted 
by announcing a second round of austerity measures, 
the first announced in December, promising to bring 
down the deficit from 12.5 to 8.7 percent this year 
and below 3 percent by 2012. Unfortunately, inves-
tors remain unconvinced, dumping Greek government 
bonds and further increasing the yield spread by more 
than 400 basis points above the German benchmark. 
Determined to bolster its credibility and bring down 
borrowing costs, the Greek government announced a 
third round of austerity measures on March 3, aim-
ing to amass €4.8 billion in savings. Factoring infla-
tion and cuts to public wages and allowances, Greek 
officials contend the blow to purchasing power will be 
equivalent to a 10 percent drop. This is significantly 
higher than that of Ireland, which cut wages by 7 per-
cent but faces deflation of 4.5 percent softening the 
blow (Kontogiannis 2010). 
 The issue is that the government’s plan will 
likely cause a deep and prolonged recession coupled 
with significant social upheaval as the cuts spread be-
yond the public sector to private companies. One must 
wonder if the cure is actually worse than the problem. 
As Münchau (2010) asserts in his commentary, “when 
a country adopts an austerity package of such mag-
nitude it needs some form of relief, simply to make it 
through the recession.” The drop in purchasing power 
coupled with medium-term inability to spend on much 
needed educational and R&D infrastructure mean the 
country solves its immediate problem by allowing a 
bigger one to fester. Paying off what the country owes 
is important, but doing so means Greece does not 
have the option to invest in its future.
 Still unable to sustain borrowing under such 
terms, Papandreou turned to his EU partners for sup-
port. Long on promises and short on details, they failed 
to agree on what to do. While endorsing the Greek aus-
terity program, political divisions and the lack of details 
failed to pacify investors. Greece insisted it was not 
asking for a bail-out, but the EU’s lack of ideas, inde-
cisiveness, and institutional incapacity fueled uncer-
tainty, driving up costs and precipitating the very out-
come almost everyone is trying to avoid—sovereign 
default. Finally, on March 25 EU leaders agreed on 
a facility to provide €25 (later raised to €45) billion to 
Greece, if needed, via EU bilateral and IMF three-year 
loans. German Chancellor A. Merkel initially insisted 
on market rates, but in April agreed to a maximum in-
terest rate ceiling of about 5 percent. Papandreou and 
several EU leaders indicated they would have favored 
a Europe-only solution, but Germany wanted IMF par-
ticipation, fearing it would end up footing the bill. The 
announcement was still vague on figures but made 
clear that aid could be invoked only as “last resort.” 
Eurozone members would reportedly retain veto over 
use of the facility (Evans-Pritchard 2010a). To provide 
loans, which amount to admission of default, the credi-
tors have demanded additional cuts in Greek wages 
and pensions, affecting every aspect of the country’s 
economic activity to an extent not seen since the civil 
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war days of the 1940s (Ziras 2010). On April 23, 2010 
Eurostat increased its estimate of Greece’s budget 
deficit to 13.6 %, triggering a rise of Greece’s 2-year 
bonds to 10 %. Unable to borrow on these terms, 
Greece informed its partners that it would activate the 
rescue package.
What is the issue?
 While most analysts agree that Greek profli-
gacy is at the root of the problem, they neglect the 
European dimension of the crisis. Keeping the analy-
sis at the domestic level, successive generations of 
the Greek policy elite have failed the country and its 
people. In true Greek spirit, Prime Minister Papan-
dreou won the October elections on promises of wage 
increases, higher social spending, and high public in-
vestment in infrastructural development (Hope 2010). 
He was long on promises to every group and short 
on details on how to pay for it all. It is impossible to 
believe that he was unaware of the government’s dire 
financial shape. While he may have been unaware of 
the true extent of the damage, as a seasoned politician 
and former prime minister he should have known bet-
ter than to promise what he probably (and now surely) 
cannot deliver. A bloated, corrupt, and inept public 
sector is not news to even the most casual observer of 
Greek politics. Politicians routinely rate this issue as a 
high priority only to abandon hope of reform as various 
groups rebel to protect their turf (Featherstone 2005). 
Even as most Greeks admit the public sector is “the 
country’s sickest patient,” S. Papaspyros, the head of 
ADEDY which is the country’s union of public sector 
employees, proclaims: “we are not going to become 
sacrificial victims, regardless of the struggle to save 
the country” (Hope 2010, 2; Tsiantar, 2010, Global 2).
 Despite cosmetic changes in the country’s 
macroeconomic indicators, structural problems re-
main intact. Greek competitiveness slowly deteriorat-
ed over the years, as productivity slowed down, un-
employment persisted at about 10 percent, and labor 
costs increased. The country now runs as a percent of 
GDP the third highest government budget deficit in the 
EU, after Ireland and the United Kingdom, the highest 
public debt in the EU, and the highest current account 
deficit in the OECD (The Economist, 2010b; Garnham 
2010). Entry into the eurozone precipitated the decline 
because the government gave up currency devalu-
ation as a tool of competitive adjustment. Instead of 
adjusting to the new euro “order,” politicians continued 
with politics as usual, long on promises and short on 
results.
 But to focus exclusively on Greece’s problems 
misses the point. There is a bigger picture here. The 
EU’s anemic, but not unexpected response has raised 
two uncomfortable questions. First, can the EU prevent 
cascading damage to the euro? The answer is prob-
ably not although damage has been so far remarkably 
contained. The euro’s value has fallen in recent months 
relative to the dollar. As Hans Redeker of Paribas said: 
“the question is not whether to sell the euro or not. 
The question is when and at what level” (Garnham, 
15). Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Ireland are all teetering 
on the brink of disaster. Ireland is currently running 
the highest budget deficit in the EU at 14 percent. Its 
consumers are buried under a mountain of mortgage 
debt, while the IMF estimates total Irish bank losses 
through 2010 may reach €35 billion or 20 percent of 
GDP (Brown 2010, 16)! Spain and Portugal run yawn-
ing budget deficits—Spain’s tax base has additionally 
collapsed following the bust in property markets—and 
Italy, though it runs a lower budget deficit, still has a 
public debt ratio that rivals that of Greece. 
 Once the weakest member of the herd is 
“cooked,” who will be next? Representing only 2 per-
cent of the eurozone’s GDP does not make Greece 
a big deal, but a domino effect of creditors’ default 
might. Almost 70 percent of Greece’s sovereign debt 
is held by foreign investors, mostly British and Irish 
banks followed by German and French investors. If 
Greece defaults, British and Irish banks, among oth-
ers, will be severely affected. As the global financial 
crisis has amply demonstrated, private bank assets 
have a bad habit of becoming public liabilities when 
the economy turns sour. According to estimates by 
Hayman Advisors, the assets of the five largest banks 
in each country relative to its GDP produce a frighten-
ing list topped by Ireland and the UK in addition to 
Iceland and Switzerland (Fisher 2010). Greece is in a 
respectable 16th place after Italy and before Canada. 
Ireland’s public debt is only 41%, but banking-system 
assets (total assets of its five largest banks) add an-
other 800% of GDP. The UK fares somewhat better, 
but its public debt plus bank assets exceed 500% of 
GDP. The list is somewhat similar to the one report-
ed by P. Toscano, using gross external debt figures 
from the World Bank and GDP figures from the CIA’s 
World Factbook (Toscano 2010). In a tightly integrated 
system, such as the EU’s financial system, damage 
in one area can quickly produce catastrophic results 
(Zahariadis 2003).
 Second, can there be monetary union without 
fiscal or political union? In an insightful essay, O. Iss-
ing (2010), a former member of the European Central 
Bank (ECB)’s executive board, argues that a Greek 
bail-out would mean the end of the euro because it 
violates EU treaties and opens the gate for more aid 
to other members. Monetary union is based on two 
pillars: stability of the euro guaranteed by an indepen-
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trade is intra-EU trade, even if under-achievers could 
miraculously improve their condition, someone in the 
EU must be willing to buy. For every seller there must 
be a buyer. Germany’s refusal to even entertain the 
thought that its surpluses may also be part of the prob-
lem that requires a coordinated solution does not bode 
well for the EU. Boosting domestic demand does not 
simply help, under certain conditions, today’s Greece 
or tomorrow’s Portugal, but it also helps Germany it-
self. Those who have the most also stand to lose the 
most in case of widespread eurozone instability. In the 
presence of huge current account imbalances and ab-
sence of a fiscal union, Europe’s monetary union is 
probably not sustainable in the long term.
What are the implications for the EU?
 The Greek drama has four implications for EU 
policy-making and European integration. First, Greece 
will likely suffer an economic catastrophe to which it 
was a willing participant, shattering the myth that sov-
ereign members of the eurozone cannot go bankrupt. 
The question is who will be next. Second, membership 
applications, especially those with financial implica-
tions such as Iceland’s, are likely to be put on hold as 
the EU digests the lessons of this crisis. Third, while 
economic fundamentals are as important as one’s 
perception of the fundamentals, EU leaders have not 
mastered the art of maintaining credibility and trust 
in the face of market adversity. The EU’s inability or 
unwillingness to aid Greece reveals the fundamen-
tal problem of individual promiscuity and institutional 
adolescence. EU leaders underline the need for co-
ordinated responses to common threats but lack the 
institutional capacity to do so. Policy failure occurred 
as a result of national promiscuity but evolved into a 
full blown crisis because of lack of supranational insti-
tutional capacity. The latter is more important than the 
former because treaty-fatigue precludes institutional 
innovation when it is needed the most. 
 Fourth, a fundamental rift is emerging between 
two competing visions of Europe. The first vision sees 
the EU as a club of sovereign states, most of which 
are bound together by a common currency. This vi-
sion is quite familiar to students of European affairs 
as the intergovernmental model, be it liberal or oth-
erwise (e.g., Moravcsik 1998; Hoffmann 1966). De-
spite attempts at integration, the EU remains a robust 
community of states with diverse preferences, domes-
tic imperatives, and international constraints. Its pur-
pose is to reduce the transaction costs of cooperation 
among its members on a variety of identifiable issue 
areas. The second vision sees the EU, and especially 
EMU, as transcending monetary union. Monetary sta-
bility requires politically enforced economic stability, 
dent European central bank, and fiscal “solidity” de-
livered by individual member states. By accepting the 
rules of monetary union, member states also accept 
the consequences. Because it is a “no transfers” com-
munity of sovereign states, transferring public funds 
from those who obeyed the rules to those who didn’t 
“would create hostility toward Brussels and between 
euro area countries” (p. 11). To quote Guido Wester-
welle, Germany’s Foreign Minister, it would be intoler-
able to “throw German and EU money out of the win-
dow and thereby reduce the pressure on Greece to 
reform” (Evans-Pritchard 2010b).
 Leaving aside the fact that talk of a bail-out, 
when a government explicitly does not ask for it, does 
more harm than good because it lends credibility to the 
outcome one is trying to avoid, the argument exposes 
two fundamental rifts. First, does the EU have the in-
stitutional capacity to deal with problems facing some 
but not all euro-members? Price stability is guaran-
teed by the ECB, but does it matter in the face of eco-
nomic instability? It clearly does not. The EU lacks the 
economic equivalent of the ECB. The idea of creating 
a politically accountable group of ministers working in 
parallel to the ECB, floated by France in 1999, was 
quickly abandoned in the name of bank independence. 
However, such neglect gave rise to former Commis-
sioner M. Monti’s recent lament: “we have focused on 
the monetary part of the economic and monetary union 
while neglecting the economic part” (Thornhill 2010, 
2). Supranational monetary stability can be mortally 
threatened by national fiscal instability. Theoretically, 
the latter can be pursued on a strictly national basis. In 
practice, strong supranational institutional infrastruc-
ture is the key to fiscal “solidity” because it promotes 
cooperation, monitoring, and transparency. Greater 
monitoring power by the European Commission is an 
important first step, but is it enough to prevent Greece 
(or Germany) from breaching again the Stability and 
Growth Pact indicators? Fines are important but will 
they be enforced when major partners are involved in 
“profligacy?”
 Second, can the EU admit to its high internal 
imbalances? The Greek turmoil reflects wider struc-
tural imbalances among the 16 eurozone members. 
Greece, Portugal, and other members run persistent 
current account deficits, but Germany, the Netherlands, 
and others run persistent current account surpluses. 
While chronic under-achievers must undoubtedly pur-
sue competitiveness through sound fiscal policies and 
productivity gains, virtuous over-achievers “should aim 
to identify and implement structural reforms that help 
in strengthening domestic demand,” according to a re-
port by the European Commission (Barber and Wies-
mann 2010, 4). Given that roughly 70 percent of EU’s 
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which must overcome nationally defined preferences. 
Solidarity and a nascent European identity emerge as 
a result of entrepreneurial actions and creeping insti-
tutionalization (Stone Sweet, Sandholtz, and Fligstein 
2001). The crisis revealed tendencies in both direc-
tions. But the European project appears rudderless; 
EU decisions were slow, mostly ineffective, and fol-
lowed rather than anticipated developments. What is 
missing is leadership that will decisively push the de-
bate in one or the other direction. There may yet be a 
European act to this Greek tragedy.
Nikolaos Zahariadis
University of Alabama at Birmingham
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United Colors of Europe?  Immigration, 
Naturalization, and EU Identity
Stephanie B. Anderson*
 While in Brussels on a recent trip, Europeans 
from a host of countries all said the same thing to me: 
“Europe and America need to learn from one another. 
For example, America does a much better job of assimi-
lating its immigrants.”  Despite its numerous, appalling 
examples of government-sponsored anti-immigrant/for-
eigner policies, for example, the internment of Japanese-
Americans during World War II and, most recently, the 
current anti-immigrant legislation in Arizona, the US is 
able to assimilate large numbers of foreigners fairly eas-
ily.  On average, the United States has given one mil-
lion immigrants legal, permanent resident status per year 
over the past twenty years.1  Could similar immigrants 
become loyal to the EU?  In other words, could immi-
grants, who have voluntarily left their homelands, being 
more mobile and therefore less attached to the individual 
member states, become more easily attached and de-
voted to the European Union?  In 2008, the European 
Parliament used a photo of a non-white European to ad-
vertise the opportunity to be MEP for the day:  was the 
audience other immigrants?
 In the context of globalization, the European 
Union has promoted its image abroad as human rights 
advocate and promoter of peace and prosperity.  Es-
pousing universal values, the EU propogates lessons 
and advice that apply to all cultures.  By the same to-
ken, globalization facilitates the movement of people to 
Europe in search of this promised peace and prosperity. 
Changing the idea of EU citizenship to embrace foreign-
ers in a similar way to the American ethos and mythos 
not only fits the image the EU seeks to promote abroad 
of universal values, but could further legitimize the idea 
of a European identity in and of itself.
Problems Grafting EU Identity onto Member State 
Nationals
 The integration process may be losing steam. 
Most decisions regarding the European Union are tak-
en by national parliaments, i.e., the educated elites, 
with whom the idea of Europe has been the most popu-
lar.2   When treaty ratification has been put to a popular 
vote, the results have been rather under-whelming.  The 
Danes voted no in the first referendum on Maastricht. 
The French voted yes only by the narrowest of margins.3 
Ireland rejected both the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon. 
Moreover, in the ten new EU members, whose populace 
overwhelmingly voted to join, only 26 percent voted in 
the 2004 European Parliament elections.  To quote Par-
liament spokesman David Harley, it was a “disappointing 
and pathetically low turnout.”4   Significantly, the Euro-
skeptic and right-wing nationalist parties achieved their 
best results to date across the Continent.5   Overall, EU-
wide turnout was just 45.3 percent, the lowest turnout in 
the history of the assembly – until it reached a new low 
in 2009.6   Both France and The Netherlands voted “no” 
putting the Constitutional treaty in limbo. Altogether, this 
public skepticism represents a significant ‘speed bump’ 
on the road to European integration.  
 Considering that member state nations have 
been hundreds of years in the making, and that 96 per-
cent of Europeans are born, live, work and die in the 
same country, one should not be surprised that Europe-
ans feel a significantly stronger loyalty and love for their 
town, region, and country than for the European Union.7 
In 2006, more than 75 percent of Europeans polled could 
not say how many Member States there were.8    Part of 
the problem is that Europeans are rooted, and therefore 
have neither explored their Union nor taken advantage 
of all the opportunities that the EU’s freedom of move-
ment offers: “Long-distance mobility is not at all common 
for Europeans: only 18% have moved outside their re-
gion, while the percentage for cross-border migration is 
especially low (only 4% ever moved to another Member 
State and fewer than 3% ever moved to another country 
outside the EU).”9  
 Mobility may be the key because people who 
have lived in more than one member state ‘feel’ appre-
ciably more European than those who have not moved 
(66 versus 48 percent).  By the same token, people 
whose parents are from more than one member state 
have more attachment to the EU.   Significantly, even 
foreigners born outside of Europe ‘feel’ more European 
than the majority of people who have lived in one MS all 
of their lives (54 versus 48 percent).10  
Immigrants as Europeans?
 These same immigrants very often have no hope 
of citizenship in EU member states.  Although jus soli, 
citizenship based on the principle of territoriality, is prac-
ticed in France as in the United States, and to a lesser 
extent in Italy, Greece, Ireland, and very recently, Ger-
many, for the most part, jus sanguinis, citizenship based 
on blood, has dominated in Europe.  As a result, even 
Gastarbeiter, that is, “guest workers” or immigrants 
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invited into a country to work, were merely ‘guests’, 
and therefore, the first to be ‘uninvited’ in the case of an 
economic downturn.  Their children, despite being born 
in the country in question, for example, Germany, were 
still considered ‘foreigners’, and marginalized.
 Helen Elizabeth Hartnell suggested that a for-
eigner’s perception of belonging is based on how “oth-
ers judge the appropriateness of their presence there.”11 
For example, although the Roma have lived in Europe 
for centuries, few member state societies deem their no-
madic presence “appropriate” and, therefore, view them 
as “foreign”.  According to the European Commission, 
“most Roma are European citizens.”12   Nevertheless, 
Italy’s government has authorized “vigilante gangs” to 
monitor Roma migrant camps and other immigrants.13  
 As a result, a host of NGOs have condemned 
EU and member state policies towards minorities.  The 
Minority Rights Group International (MRG) called upon 
the “EU to bring its internal anti-discrimination standards 
up to the level of international human and minority rights 
law.”14   Human Rights Watch admonished European 
migration policies that focused “on removing (the mi-
grants) who are present rather than ensuring their rights 
are protected.”15   The UN High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights “criticized the detention periods in the direc-
tive as excessive and an erosion of the right to liberty for 
migrants.”16   
 In the US, in debating the anti-immigrant, Kyl 
Amendment disallowing any paths for immigrant workers 
to get citizenship, Senator John McCain cited the nega-
tive effects of such policies in Europe:  “Why is it that all 
over Europe you find these enclaves of foreign workers 
who are totally and completely separate from society? 
Because they are in the situation which this amendment 
would dictate:  No hope, no opportunity, no future, but we 
will let you work.”17 
 Although the American ‘melting pot’ is fraught 
with problems, Lipset argued “the image of the universal-
istic American “melting pot” would appear to be validated 
by intermarriage statistics, which indicate that majorities 
of Catholics, Jews, Italians, Irish, and Japanese Ameri-
cans marry out of their ancestral groups. … The “melting 
pot” remains as appropriate an image as ever.”18   Other 
multinational countries such as Canada and Brazil work 
hard at creating a “national” identity to bind their coun-
tries together.  In the case of the United States, a national 
identity is woven around a civil religion19  and a creed20 
rather than the traditional glue of race or language.21   In-
terestingly, the EU’s motto, “united in diversity” is almost 
identical to the American motto, E pluribus Unum.  Could 
the EU, another multinational society, adopt the US at-
titude towards immigrants, and in doing so, help glue the 
Union together?
Could the naturalization process help to legitimize 
European identity?
 Without a clear home, these immigrants could 
become the first ‘Europeans’, writ large.  In other words, 
it may be easier for immigrants to become ‘European’ 
rather than, for instance, Italian or German.  Having left 
their home country voluntarily, and being rejected by 
most member state blood requirements for citizenship, 
these foreigners may be more likely to adopt a Euro-
pean identity based on the EU’s creed.  By definition, 
immigrant groups are mobile.  With immigrant pockets 
of Turks, Muslims, Chinese, Roma, etc., in almost every 
member state, these migrants may have fewer qualms 
at taking advantage of the freedom of movement the EU 
offers than its native born citizens as their diasporas pro-
vide them a cultural base throughout the Union.
 Immigrants may well take more easily to a citi-
zenship based on a creed where an individual can ‘elect’ 
to be a citizen while still keeping one’s culture.  What 
is the European civic creed?  Through the hardship of 
war, the Europeans have learned how to create a EU-
topia.22   To be a ‘European’, one must be dedicated to 
peace and the promulgation of international law.  The Eu-
ropean believes in economic progress and human rights. 
This characterization of the European is pervasive in EU 
rhetoric.  For example, Javier Solana characterized the 
European when he declared, “We are pro-peace, pro-
security, pro-justice.”23   Such values are encapsulated in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights:
 
The peoples of Europe, in creating an ever clos-
er union among them, are resolved to share a 
peaceful future based on common values.
Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the 
Union is founded on the indivisible, universal val-
ues of human dignity, freedom, equality and soli-
darity; it is based on the principles of democracy 
and the rule of law. It places the individual at the 
heart of its activities, by establishing the citizen-
ship of the Union and by creating an area of free-
dom, security and justice [emphasis added].24 
Being universal and applicable to all the peoples of Eu-
rope, the immigrant could become ‘European’ by adopt-
ing these values.
 Moreover, such an explicit adoption of EU val-
ues could further validate the European project.  With 
regards to US democracy, Bonnie Honig explained that 
the act of naturalizing a citizen is a reaffirmation of the 
American ethos and mythos: “The American need for pe-
riodic testimony to the true universality of its principles 
and the choiceworthiness of its democracy is met by new 
immigrant foreigners.” A common image in the media is 
the lines of immigrants of all different ethnic groups and 
ages, holding American flags and swearing an oath to 
their new homeland.  In doing so, “it reperforms the ori-
gin of the regime as an act of consent.”  In other words, 
the act is a useful tool for the government to unite the 
people:  “[R]ites of renaturalization reenact the regime’s 
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ideologically approved origins, obscuring the nonconsen-
sual and ascriptive bases and present-day practices of 
American democracy.”25  The EU has similar nonconsen-
sual practices and issues exemplified by the democratic 
deficit.  Without whitewashing the problems in American 
democracy, could such a tool be useful to the European 
Union? 
Conclusion:  United Colors of Europe?
 The Economist argued “Immigration places 
America at the centre of a web of global networks.”  De-
spite the concerns of unemployment, it advocates loos-
ening US immigration laws because
 Immigration provides America with legions of 
unofficial ambassadors, deal-brokers, recruiters 
and boosters. Immigrants not only bring the best 
ideas from around the world to American shores; 
they are also a conduit for spreading American 
ideas and ideals back to their homelands, thus 
increasing their adoptive country’s soft power.26 
 Globalization means that Europe is becoming 
such a hub as well; how can it draw upon these resourc-
es?  In many ways, Europe really has no choice:  the 
people are coming and the EU will have to deal with them. 
Furthermore, demographics are weakening Europe; with 
a negative birthrate, Europeans are getting older and will 
need care.27   Clearly, these immigrants will not be able 
to become citizens based on blood ties, but perhaps they 
can buy into the European creed for the benefit of every-
one.  
 If there is a lesson that Europe can learn from the 
Americans, it is in the power of a mythos both to attract 
people and to tie them to their new country. According to 
Jim Cloos, Director for General Political Questions in the 
General Secretary of the Council European Union, the 
way to export European values and stability is by foster-
ing a “circle of friends” around its borders. The tool it uses 
to attract these friends is the prospect of closer ties and 
a share in the EU’s prosperity and political stability: “We 
have enormous power of attraction.”28   European ide-
als do have enormous power of attraction.  Rather than 
concentrating on surrounding countries, as Cloos recom-
mends – creating a buffer in effect -- the EU needs to in-
tegrate the immigrants attracted to the European way of 
life by offering them the same share in the EU’s prosper-
ity.  In doing so, the EU would create millions of ‘friendly’ 
ambassadors and links to the world.  By embracing for-
eigners with a creed that allows non-Europeans to buy 
into these ideals, the EU will significantly increase its soft 
power – and perhaps prosperity and stability as well -- in 
an increasingly globalized world.
Stephanie B. Anderson, University of Wyoming
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Economics Section Activities
 During 2009-10 the Economics Interest Section 
focused on the issues that the global financial crisis 
has thrown up Europe. We held our third interconfer-
ence workshop in March 2010, this time with the sup-
port of the Globalization Centre at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas. Adam Posen (Bank of England Mon-
etary Policy Committee) gave our lunchtime keynote 
talk.  We thank Mark Wynne and his colleagues from 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas for their hospital-
ity, logistical support and participation.  The workshop 
website (which also contains the papers presented at 
this event) can be found at http://www.dallasfed.org/
institute/events/10eu.cfm.
 This year also saw the publication of selected 
papers from the previous workshop (at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis) on the theme of integration 
and globalization in a special issue of the North Ameri-
can Journal of Economics and Finance (Vol. 12, No. 
2) edited by Patrick Crowley, David Mayes and Sven 
Arndt.  We summarize some of the main findings in the 
rest of this contribution from our interest section.
 The interest section plans to organise a series 
of panel sessions on topical economic issues, a round-
table, and a ‘keynote presentation’ in next year’s EUSA 
conference in Boston. All conference participants will 
be very welcome to attend our sessions, roundtables 
and keynote presentation.
Globalization and Regionalization –
 A Brief Summary
 There are three major forces driving the cur-
rent wave of globalization.  Two involve economic 
policy and acts of policy coordination, while the third 
is technology. The series of GATT/WTO trade negotia-
tion rounds that began shortly after World War II are 
clearly central. The second driving force is preferential 
(regional) economic integration via free trade areas 
and customs unions, of which the European Union is a 
leading example. While both approaches contribute to 
openness and intensified links among trading partners, 
the advantage of GATT/WTO lies in its inclusiveness 
and adherence to the principle of non-discrimination.
 Indeed, the discriminatory nature of preferential 
trade agreements has raised concerns about whether 
such arrangements will in the end act as stumbling 
rather than building blocks for further integration of the 
global economy. While preferential arrangements gen-
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erate economic benefits through trade creation, those 
benefits are typically mitigated and sometimes over-
whelmed by the negative effects of trade diversion. On 
the other hand, the experience of the European Union 
suggests that collaboration within a small group may 
be better suited for ‘deeper’ forms of integration and 
for tackling governance problems associated with in-
tegration.
 Globalization is likely to be ‘lumpy’. Some 
countries will be more open in terms of exports and 
imports relative to GDP than others, with large and di-
versified countries like the United States always less 
open than smaller ones. The future global economy 
will likely contain large dominant financial and non-
financial firms with global reach and global market-
making powers. This has already raised a host of is-
sues with respect to regulation and oversight, not least 
in light of the credit crisis of 2007–2009.
 Within this future global economy, given cur-
rent trends, there are likely to be groupings of coun-
tries with large shares of intra-group trade and finance 
relative to total trade and financial flows. In this spirit, 
in their contribution to our journal special edition, Her-
rmann and Winkler imagine a world of ‘convergence 
clubs’, each with a core and a periphery of countries, 
but not necessarily always in a purely regional set-
ting. Their case studies are Europe and East Asia. In 
their paper, Demertzis, Hughes Hallett and Schermer 
study the integration of labor markets in the euro area. 
Given the importance attributed in the optimum cur-
rency area literature to labor mobility as a prerequisite 
for deeper integration, what are the lessons from Eu-
rope?
 Given increased labor mobility if these regional 
blocs graduate to common markets another issue will 
be fiscal policy.  In our special issue, Neumann, Hol-
man and Alm look at the mobility of factors of produc-
tion and how increased factor mobility affects the abil-
ity of governments to tax these factors in the face of 
competition among different taxing jurisdictions. The 
findings are intuitive—that mobility will decrease the 
ability of governments to raise additional revenues un-
less equivalent services are supplied to increase loca-
tional attractiveness.
 Another important question about the future 
global economy will be the nature of exchange-rate ar-
rangements. Will there be as many currencies as there 
are today? Will there be currency blocs with intra-bloc 
monetary policy coordination? In the debate on fixed 
vs. floating rates, an important criterion favoring fixed 
rates has been the degree of symmetry - in economic 
structure and exposure to shocks - across countries. 
Strong asymmetries have been seen as an argument 
against fixed rates, because countries would want to 
retain monetary policy autonomy in order to deal with 
asymmetric shocks. Hence the question, raised by Ar-
tis and Okubo in our special issue, as to whether glo-
balization promotes convergence of business cycles. 
It would be easier for countries to contemplate com-
mon currencies and other fixed-rate regimes if there is 
an affirmative answer to this question.
 The impact of European integration on be-
haviour and hence on the shape of the cycle is not 
straightforward. Marzinotto for example argues that 
the increasing credibility of monetary policy has led to 
increased nominal price stickiness and hence to a flat-
tening of the Phillips curve – the relationship between 
unemployment and inflation. This would require a 
more active macroeconomic policy, particularly in the 
downside of the cycle. The increasing coordination of 
labour markets, discussed by Demertzis, Hughes-Hal-
lett and Schemer, reduces the ability of the EU coun-
tries to offset each other. However, it is globalization 
which appears to the main driver, with the US taking a 
greater lead in the determination of wages in the EU 
than Germany. They too find that this leads to a flat-
tening of the Phillips curve.
 Although financial opening does not automati-
cally lead to financial deepening, does it enhance the 
pre-conditions for deeper integration? In their paper 
in our journal special issue, de Pace and Contessi 
ask whether the observed rise in intra-EU correlations 
among cross-sectional capital flows allows the region 
to be treated as a single entity or ‘country’ with respect 
to capital movements. A positive answer would then 
suggest that policies dealing with such flows might 
productively be moved from the national to the EU 
level.
 Given the recent turn of events, some academ-
ics might be skeptical regarding the relevance of glo-
balization as a future driver behind further integration. 
The collection of papers in our special issue, however, 
hopefully provides some evidence to the contrary. If 
globalization continues once an economic recovery is 
underway, it may spur a further wave of economic in-
tegration, and there is ample room for this. Not only is 
there potential in trade (particularly in agriculture), but 
also in terms of capital flows and integration of finan-
cial markets. However, political reticence may stand in 
the way of economic advantage, inhibiting the path of 
widening the EU.
Patrick Crowley, Texas A&M, Corpus Christi
David Mayes, University of Auckland
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EUSA BIENNIAL CONFERENCE 
Boston, March 3-5, 2011 
 
Call for papers and panels 
 
The European Union Studies Association invites scholars and practitioners engaged in the 
study of Europe and the European Union to submit panel and paper proposals for its 2011 
Twelfth Biennial International Conference, March 3-5, in Boston, Massachusetts. This 
conference also marks the 22th anniversary of EUSA. The Program Committee plans to 
promote the broadest possible exchange of theoretical approaches, disciplinary perspectives 
and research agendas. Please note the following: 
 
1.  On the basics of paper and panel proposals: 
 
* We welcome both paper and panel proposals, particularly those that foster 
transatlantic dialogue. Panel proposals need to consist of three to four papers. 
* Participants are limited to two appearances on the conference program (two papers or 
one paper and one discussant role; chair roles do not count toward the appearance 
limit). Participants should therefore submit no more than two proposals. 
* For organizational reasons, the program is subdivided into seven substantive sections 
(integration theory, institutions, economics and political economy, political sociology, 
law and public policy, external relations). Please indicate for which section you would 
like to be considered. Note that there is no fixed number of panels for each section. 
Choosing one section rather than another does not enhance or diminish your chances 
of having your paper or panel accepted. 
 
2.  Other conditions: 
 
* The Program Committee reserves the right to make changes to organized panel 
proposals, including their composition. 
* You do not need to be an EUSA member to submit a proposal, but all those appearing 
on the conference program must be current EUSA members. 
* We cannot honor individual scheduling requests; by submitting a proposal you agree 
to be available from 8:30 a.m. on Thursday, March 3rd through 6:00 p.m. on 
Saturday, March 5th. 
 
The 2011 Program Committee is: 
 
Program Co-Chairs 
Daniel Kelemen (Rutgers University) 
Erik Jones (SAIS Bologna Center) 
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on the conference program must be current EUSA members. 
* We cannot honor individual scheduling requests; by submitting a proposal you agree 
to be available from 8:30 a.m. on Thursday, March 3rd through 6:00 p.m. on 
Saturday, March 5th. 
 
The 2011 Program Committee is: 
 
Program Co-Chairs 
Daniel Kelemen (Rutgers University) 
Erik Jones (SAIS Bologna Center) 
 
 
Law, Public Policy, and Regulation 
R. Daniel Kelemen (Rutgers University) 
This section welcomes papers focusing on the European Court of Justice, legal integration 
and the full spectrum of substantive areas of EU public policy-making and regulation. 
 
History and Institutions 
Wolfram Kaiser (University of Portsmouth) 
This section welcomes papers focussing on the origins, development and/or current operation 
of individual EU institutions, their functions, cultures, relations with other EU institutions 
and political actors and their decision-making processes. 
 
Sociology, Political Behaviour, and Elections 
Catherine De Vries (University of Amsterdam) 
This section welcomes papers focusing on public opinion and political mobilization 
concerning European integration, including studies of European elections and referenda, 
public attitudes about integration, the impact of the EU on domestic elections and social 
movement and interest group activities. 
 
Economics and Political Economy 
Patrick Leblond (University of Ottowa) 
The section welcomes papers focusing on economic policies and processes, including trade, 
investment, employment, competition, fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange rates, and 
welfare state reform.  The section also welcomes papers on economic phenomena like the 
global financial crisis, the rise of China, or demographic change. 
 
External Relations, Enlargement, and Security 
Alasdair Young (University of Glasgow) 
This section welcomes papers on all aspects of EU foreign and security policy (CFSP / 
ESDP), EU international trade policy and the EU as a 'civilian' or 'normative' power.  The 
section also encourages submissions focussing on past and potential future EU enlargement. 
 
Integration Theory and Methodology 
Tanja Boerzel (Free University of Berlin) 
This section welcomes papers focusing on the theory of European integration and 
methodological issues in the study of the EU. 
 
Teaching the EU 
Peter Loedel (West Chester University) 
This section welcomes paper and panel proposals on any and all aspects of Teaching the 
European Union. 
 
The firm deadline for receipt of paper and panel proposals is September 30, 2010. We regret 
that we cannot consider proposals received after this date. You will be notified of the 
Program Committee's decision regarding your proposal by December 15, 2010. 
 
How to submit a paper or panel proposal: All proposals must be submitted via our online 
proposal submission forms, which will be located at www.eustudies.org beginning August 4, 
2010. Proposals must be submitted via the website. We do not accept proposals by e-mail, 
regular mail or via facsimile.  Address all questions about the proposal process to 
eusa@pitt.edu. 
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Pollack, Mark A., and Gregory C. Shaffer. When 
Cooperation Fails: The International Law and Politics 
of Genetically Modified Foods. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2009. 
 Mark Pollack and Greg Shaffer’s When Co-
operation Fails is a masterful analysis of the causes 
and consequences of the failure of transatlantic coop-
eration as it relates to agricultural biotechnology. The 
story is as foretold by the title: despite over a decade 
of efforts, transatlantic cooperation over the regulation 
of agricultural biotechnology has failed. At the domes-
tic level (chapter 2), multiple factors and contingent 
events led the US and the EU to adopt substantially 
divergent –and, ultimately, highly path-dependent—
approaches to the regulation of agricultural biotech-
nology. Bilateral efforts (chapter 3) foundered against 
these entrenched domestic positions, with hard bar-
gaining on the basis of fixed positions typically over-
whelming a more cooperative “deliberative” problem-
solving mode. Internationally (chapter 4), the parties 
faced “battle of the sexes” incentives, in which distri-
butional concerns loom large. Worse still, they had to 
operate in a “regime complex” formed by many partly-
overlapping, partly-duplicative, partly-competing inter-
national organizations that defy frictionless movement 
from problem to institutional solution. Coming back to 
the domestic level in a second image reversed idiom 
(chapter 6), we find only small changes in either regu-
latory approach, fewer still that are directly attributable 
to transnational/international pressures. Thus, not only 
has cooperation failed, but the EU-US dispute over 
agricultural biotechnology promises to endure.
 This progression by level-of-analysis works 
very effectively as an organizing device, allowing the 
authors to logically present a mountain of material (118 
pages of footnotes and references!). The main excep-
tion involves chapter 5, which provides a lengthy as-
sessment and evaluation of the WTO dispute-settle-
ment panel’s 2006 decision in the EC-Biotech case, 
brought by the US and others against the EU’s de 
facto ban on approval of new GM varieties. This is ob-
viously an important part of the story. But at 57 pages, 
setting itself a normative explanatory task at odds with 
the positive orientation of the rest of the book, and re-
quiring a separate explanatory apparatus (compara-
tive institutional analysis), the chapter feels over-long 
and out-of place.
 Empirically encyclopedic works are sometimes 
more read and consulted than cited. That should not 
be the case here. When Cooperation Fails makes a 
range of contributions that should put it at the center 
of a number of research agendas in international rela-
tions and law. For the sake of brevity, I will identify four 
especially laudable and/or noteworthy features.
First, it revives the venerable tradition of the book-
length case study, a form which should have a place 
in our collective toolkits. Anticipating the “generaliz-
ability” question, the authors argue persuasively, if too 
briefly, that agricultural biotech represents the thin end 
of a wedge of issues that will come increasingly to oc-
cupy policymakers. While it is difficult to establish the 
“leading edge” character of a particular issue with any 
certainty, incipient processes certainly should be stud-
ied as and where they are happening. If the assump-
tion of “leadingness” is correct, generalizability should 
follow as the process unfolds.
 Second, the study of cooperation failure itself is 
a worthwhile contribution. Liberal IR theory has been 
overwhelmingly biased toward successful coopera-
tion. This probably stems from its intellectual history, 
growing as it did out of a rejection of (structural) realist 
pessimism in this regard. But the time has come for 
us to turn the considerable analytical power of these 
theories to phenomena which, we assume, happen all 
the time, but about which we have nothing or little to 
say. Cooperation failure is one such phenomenon.
 Third, the authors have a particularly fresh and 
intriguing understanding of the “vertical” interaction of 
domestic and international law and politics. They are 
among the very few authors who grapple with path-de-
pendence and institutional stickiness as they relate to 
international relations. Their account combines 1) real 
dynamics, as in the stickiness of domestic policy over 
time; 2) a second image story of how (inside) domes-
tic factors drive outside (international) ones; and 3) a 
Book Reviews
EUSA members interested in reviewing re-
cent EU-related books, please contact the 
reviews editor:
Dr. Amie Kreppel
Center for European Studies
3324 Turlington Hall PO 117342
University of Florida
Gainesville Florida 32611-7342, USA
Kreppel@ces.ufl.edu
Publishers should send two review copies
of books directly to Dr. Kreppel.
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second image reversed story of how outside factors 
feedback into the domestic arena. Taken individually, 
these elements would scarcely warrant a mention. 
Taken together, they advance the IR research agenda 
a considerable way.
 Fourth, Pollack and Shaffer provide a field-ad-
vancing treatment of institutional multiplicity and com-
plexity “horizontally” at the international level. Schol-
ars are only now beginning to take the measure of this 
problem. In many areas of international relations and 
law, the key problem is not anarchy (a dearth of institu-
tions), but polyarchy (a surfeit of them). Understand-
ing over-institutionalized spaces is becoming a press-
ing concern as the number and range of governance 
sites proliferates, and the treatment of these issues in 
chapter 4 of When Cooperation Fails is rich with ideas 
about how to approach this task.
 In short, while specialists in agricultural biotech 
and transatlantic relations will find When Cooperation 
Fails” must-reading,” the book should also be engaged 
by a wide range of specialists in international law, poli-
tics and political economy.
Joseph Jupille
 
Antje Wiener. The Invisible Constitution of Politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008
 The Invisible Constitution of Politics provides 
an original framework to study the contested mean-
ings of norms in a world of increasing international 
encounters by using the European Union (EU) as a 
case study. The book addresses the question of how 
it is possible that norms remain contested, in cases 
when governments have agreed on rules and texts, 
and compliance is motivated by the logic of appropri-
ateness. Interviewing elites about the meanings they 
attach to the constitutional norms in the EU, this book 
aims at revealing the constitutive, albeit invisible, fea-
tures of politics which form “the meaning-in-use” in 
day-to-day politics “beyond-the-state” context.
 The author claims that the traditional dimen-
sions to study norms and their impact on international 
politics have been insufficient to account for all con-
stitutive elements in constitutionalism. In addition to 
formal validity, that is characterized by its visibility in 
the form of legal written documents, and social rec-
ognition as a reference for implementation of formally 
endorsed norms, this book, therefore, adds an interac-
tive process of cultural validation which “reflects and 
constitutes the meaning that is already in use” (p.6). 
 The book is divided into three sections. Part I 
emphasizes the importance of bringing cultural prac-
tices back into studies of constitutionalism to make 
“meaning” accountable for the study of norms. To this 
end, this section argues that not only organizational 
practices, but also their link with cultural practices, 
should be taken into account to understand the con-
struction of the multiplicity of meanings of norms. Wie-
ner then moves on to the description of her methodol-
ogy and research propositions that guide her empirical 
research. The case study uses comparative discourse 
analysis on the four interviewed elite groups in the EU: 
Londoners and Berliners (elites in different domestic 
political arenas) German Brusselites, and British Brus-
selites (elites in transnational settings). These four 
elite groups and their connection to their political set-
ting are used as indicators of divergence on the mean-
ing of norms presented in the case study (domestic vs. 
transnational, domestic vs. domestic, transnational vs. 
transnational) (p.81).   
 The comparison serves to demonstrate diver-
gence, convergence or diffusion of meanings among 
elite groups.  Wiener uses four research assumptions 
to be able to evaluate why the meanings attributed to 
the norms by different elite groups might converge or 
diverge (p.51-57). The first of these propositions, lib-
eral community hypothesis, is driven from compliance 
literature and claims that the elites from the EU mem-
ber states, or any other international organizations, 
thus, are likely to interpret norms in similar ways. The 
second proposition, the layer-cake assumption argues 
that the elites as a social group converge on the mean-
ings of norms across different political contexts due to 
high social interaction and cultural assimilation among 
them. On the contrary, the national identity-options 
assumption argues that elites with different national 
identities are likely to diverge in their interpretations 
of the meaning. Lastly, the rule-in-practice assumption 
expects divergence according to the level of interac-
tion in the context. 
 As the case study in Part II demonstrates, the 
first three propositions regarding the interpretation of 
meaning by the elites do not hold true because there 
is no clear divergence among German Brusselites, 
and British Brusselites, while divergence is apparent 
between Berliners and Londoners across issues such 
as citizenship, democracy and the rule of law, and hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms. Therefore, the 
only contextual proposition that seems to be tenable, 
is the rule-in-practice. Expanding on this insight in Part 
III, Wiener concludes that “we can expect an increas-
ing diversity in the interpretation of normative mean-
ings”, “in the absence of transnationalized interaction 
patterns” (p.213).
 One important criticism regarding the empirical 
chapter and the conclusion drawn by this chapter is the 
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policies and childcare policies support European fami-
lies and reflect real ‘family values’, whereas conserva-
tive advocates of ‘family values’ in the US in practice 
do little to address the needs of working families.  Of 
course, generous social policies have to be paid for, 
and many Europeans pay higher taxes than Americans 
to support their social systems. However, in one of the 
most compelling arguments in the book, Hill attacks 
the ‘myth of the overtaxed European’.  First, he shows 
that when all forms of taxes are considered, differ-
ences in tax rates for most Europeans and Americans 
are much more modest than is commonly assumed. 
Second, he rightly points out that many Americans are 
forced to pay out of pocket for many services – from 
health, to education, to elderly care – that are financed 
by tax revenues in Europe.
 After discussing Europe’s social capitalism in 
general terms, Hill turns to an in depth discussion of 
health care. Again, he dispels myths and caricatures. 
While many Americans equate ‘socialized medicine’ 
with the British National Health Service, Hill shows 
that France, Germany and other European countries 
have achieved universal, quality healthcare without 
a ‘government takeover’ of the health care system – 
while spending much less overall on health care than 
does the US.
 Next Hill explores ‘Sustainable Europe’, focus-
ing on energy and transport policies.  For those who 
recall America’s role as a leader on environmental is-
sues in the 1970s, these chapters may make for de-
pressing reading.  As Hill illustrates with a wealth of 
examples, Europe has become a global leader in re-
newable energy and fuel efficient transport while the 
US has lagged behind.
 Having surveyed a range of domestic policies, 
Hill looks at the emerging role of the European Union 
on the world stage.  He shows that the increasing inte-
gration of Europe has given the member states of the 
EU a new kind of influence on the world stage.  In an 
argument that will be very familiar to EU scholars, he 
suggests that while the EU lacks the military might of 
the US, it wields ‘smart power’ or civilian power and 
has enormous influence across a range of issues from 
global trade talks, to development aid, to democracy 
promotion.
 Hill concludes the book by looking at a num-
ber of the major challenges to the ‘European Way’. 
Two demographic challenges stand out. Substantial 
increases in immigration to western Europe have cre-
ated strains, as countries wrestle with questions of 
how to integrate new immigrants groups.  This is par-
ticularly true with regard to Muslim immigrant commu-
nities, as evidenced by ‘veil controversies’ in France, 
the UK and elsewhere and by the recent wave of 
fact that the questions in the interview about “Schen-
gen”, “enlargement”, and “constitutional politics” are 
associated with three constitutional norms: ‘citizen-
ship’, ‘democracy and the rule of law’ and ‘human rights 
and fundamental freedoms’ respectively. Although one 
can cast doubt on this close association of the mean-
ing of the EU policy areas with the meanings of norms, 
the success of an alternative approach to study “the 
meanings of norms” without referring to practical is-
sue areas also seems dubious. In sum, Wiener’s book 
introduces a thought-provoking research agenda that 
has long been overlooked and suggests some intrigu-
ing new potential paths for future analysis.
Asli Baysal
Steven Hill. Europe’s Promise: Why the European 
Way is the Best Hope in an Insecure Age. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2010. 
 We’ve all heard of the ‘American Way’, but is 
there a ‘European Way’? In Europe’s Promise, Steven 
Hill explores European approaches to a range of con-
temporary policy challenges – from economic policy, 
to social policy, to health care, to climate change, to 
foreign policy – and argues that there is a distinctive 
‘European Way’. He asks readers to discard outmod-
ed caricatures of the ‘Old Continent’ that are regularly 
reinforced in American media coverage of Europe – 
namely that European economies are inefficient, over-
taxed and uncompetitive, and that Europe is deeply 
divided politically.  Instead, he demonstrates that the 
economically advanced democracies of Europe have 
developed a model of social capitalism and a wide 
range of public policies that may serve as models for 
American reformers and for other nations around the 
world.  In short, he argues that Europe has become 
a global leader, with a model of sustainable develop-
ment and social capitalism that offers the most hopeful 
path forward for the 21st Century.
 Part one of the book describes what he calls 
Europe’s “social capitalism”.  The discussion is far 
ranging, as Hill takes us from the post-War roots of 
labor-management relations policies in Germany to 
European reactions to the 2008-09 financial crisis. 
Throughout this section, Hill makes it clear that Euro-
pean countries have established a distinctive approach 
to capitalism that combines the pursuit of economic 
growth with a far greater commitment to social cohe-
sion than America’s “Wall Street Capitalism” allows. 
Along the way, he highlights the economic advantages 
of institutions and policies such as ‘co-determination’ 
and ‘flexicurity’.  He also argues that European social 
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anti-burqa legislation emerging across Europe.  And 
while there is much political and social resistance to 
increased immigration, Europe actually needs more 
people! Indeed, immigration has been one of the few 
trends counteracting the population decline in Europe. 
In a chapter subtitled, “Where are all the children?”, 
Hill reviews data on the unprecedentedly low fertility 
rates in many European countries and the population 
declines and potential threat to the European social 
model that they portend.  He then discusses the policy 
options that may increase fertility rates and reverse 
this demographic decline.
 The two great strengths of Europe’s Prom-
ise are its breadth and its accessibility.  Steven Hill 
manages to survey in one book and extremely rich 
cross section of the policies and political practices that 
make “The European Way” distinctive – from health 
care policies, to environmental policies, to family and 
other social policies, to foreign policy.  Hill’s book is 
also very well written – in an engaging journalistic 
style – that will draw in undergraduates and seasoned 
academics alike. The book’s weaknesses are the flip 
side of its strengths. In its pursuit of breadth and ac-
cessibility, it sometimes sacrifices depth. Likewise, in 
an effort to generalize about The European Way the 
book downplays the differences across European 
countries in many areas of public policy.  Neverthe-
less, the book makes a great contribution to European 
studies – communicating in one compelling volume so 
much of what is distinctive and appealing about “The 
European Way”. The book will make ideal reading for 
undergraduate survey courses on European politics or 
comparative (US/EU) public policy.
Dan Keleman
Marc Morjé Howard.  The Politics of Citizenship in 
Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009.
 With due respect to the considerable volume 
of research published in the last five to ten years on 
citizenship in Europe, this is the most intelligent book 
on the subject to date.  Marc Howard writes clearly 
and well on citizenship law in the 27 countries of the 
European Union (EU), with special focus on the “old” 
EU 15.  
 The subject of the research is the access to cit-
izenship for immigrants in Europe – for both adults and 
children.  Professor Howard demonstrates wide varia-
tion in citizenship laws through the construction of the 
Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) and theorizes about two 
types of variation:  the initial laws governing access 
to citizenship for immigrants and the more recent ef-
forts of some states to liberalize their restrictive laws. 
In answer to the first question, Howard hypothesizes 
that those countries with significant colonial empires 
in the 19th century, combined with early democratiza-
tion, adopted laws that were more inclusive – that is, 
laws that provided easier access to citizenship for both 
adult immigrants and their children.  The experience of 
mixing with other peoples, reflective of the imperial ex-
perience, and the civic orientation of democracy com-
bined to create an idea of citizenship that was more 
inclusive.  These countries are France, Belgium and 
the UK, with Ireland as a component part of the Brit-
ish Empire.  The remaining 11 countries of the “old” 
EU adopted restrictive, ethnically oriented, citizenship 
laws.
 In answer to the second question, Howard 
points to the politics of citizenship:  the latent pres-
sures for liberalization (demographic change, interna-
tional norms, interest group pressure and the courts) 
and for restriction (anti-immigrant public opinion).  The 
politics plays out through the party system, where 
center left parties are more amenable to liberalization, 
and the mobilization of anti-immigrant public opinion 
through extreme right parties and/or initiative and ref-
erenda movements.  Those countries that were able 
to avoid mobilization of the extreme right responded 
primarily to the liberalizing pressures.  Those coun-
tries with extreme right mobilization responded to the 
restrictive pressures and failed to liberalize.  
 There are three important contributions in this 
volume that should be highlighted.  The first is the Citi-
zenship Policy Index.  To date, there have been few 
mechanisms for comparing very complex laws across 
countries.  The CPI takes three elements of citizenship 
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policy – jus soli provisions for children of immigrants, 
the length of residence required for naturalization, and 
the provision for dual citizenship – as the most criti-
cal components of citizenship laws for immigrants and 
quantifies these laws.  This is a very useful baseline 
that permits at least limited quantitative analysis.
 The other two contributions are theoretical. 
The first is that Howard argues that the determinants 
of the initial citizenship laws are not necessarily identi-
cal to the determinants of subsequent change.  He is 
the first to clarify this distinction and he is probably 
right.  He also argues that the status quo ante makes 
a difference in the probability of liberalization.  Coun-
tries with relatively liberal citizenship laws are not as 
likely to succumb to liberalization pressures as those 
countries with very restrictive laws.  This is also an 
important, and overlooked, point in the citizenship lit-
erature.  
 Howard’s book moves the research agenda on 
immigrant incorporation through citizenship forward in 
important ways.  Scholars in the field need to build 
on his work in at least three ways.  The first is to ex-
pand the CPI to include other elements of citizenship 
law.  These laws are complex and, although the three 
components included in the initial index are crucial, 
there are other elements that are also important.  One 
distinction is whether the grant of citizenship is sub-
ject to administrative discretion or not; another is the 
degree to which immigrants have to demonstrate their 
degree of integration into the society.  Some of the re-
cent legislative changes to citizenship laws in Europe 
pass under the radar screen of this index.
 The second criticism of the volume is the focus 
on liberalization of citizenship laws.  In general, we 
should be interested in change rather than a particular 
direction of change.  Empirically, of course, the biggest 
change in European citizenship laws has been their 
liberalization.  But our theories need to be couched in 
more generic terms of change in either direction:  what 
are the conditions under which states liberalize or re-
strict their access to citizenship.  
 And finally, as Howard himself suggests in his 
conclusions, citizenship is a global issue, not a Euro-
pean issue.  All countries must confront the construc-
tion of citizenship laws and may well have to recon-
sider those laws, given changing circumstances.  The 
least persuasive part of Howard’s argument is the de-
terminants of original citizenship laws through colonial 
experience and timing of democratization.  There may 
well be an empirical regularity here, in Europe, but it is 
hard to see how the Belgian colonial experience in the 
Congo – initially as King Leopold’s private preserve – 
actually shaped a more inclusive definition of Belgian 
citizenship.  Thinking about the issue of state member-
ship in more generic terms may well shed additional 
light on these issues and give the empirical regular-
ity a more solid causal connection.  And, although the 
proportion of migrants from developing to developed 
countries has increased dramatically in the last 50 
years, migration flows are global and almost half of 
the world’s international migrants are located outside 
of wealthy democracies.  Scholars need to think about 
the pressures for liberalization and restriction in more 
generic political processes.  Howard does emphasize 
the illiberal nature of democracies in incorporating mi-
grants, a point that should all give us pause as we wit-
ness the spread of democratization around the globe.
 This volume is well worth the money and the 
time.  It is well written, makes important contributions, 
and clarifies the direction for future research.
Jeannette Money
Tanja A. Börzel, ed. Coping with Accession to the 
European Union: New Modes of Environmental Gov-
ernance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
 This edited volume is a thorough and insightful 
account of the role of new modes of governance—un-
derstood as the involvement of private actors in public 
policy making through nonhierarchical coordination—
in helping future member states to cope with their ac-
cession to the European Union (EU). The role of new 
modes of governance in the context of European in-
tegration is explored on the basis of the southern and 
eastern enlargements of the EU, and in terms of its 
common environmental policies. The volume presents 
the findings of a research project “Coping with the 
Challenge of Accession” as part of an integrated proj-
ect “New Modes of Governance in Europe,” funded by 
the Sixth Framework Program of the EU and coordi-
nated by the European University Institute. The project 
explored how transition countries in southern Europe 
as well as central and eastern Europe (CEE) coped 
with the challenge of accession to the EU by using 
new nonhierarchical modes of governance .
 The book addresses the question, to what ex-
tent have nonstate actors assisted the governments 
of southern and CEE accession countries in adopting 
and adapting to the acquis communautaire? The ma-
jor finding of the research team is that new modes of 
governance played at best a marginal role in the ac-
cession of southern European and CEE countries to 
the EU. The team further explains this empirical find-
ing by demonstrating that the accession countries of 
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the southern and eastern enlargements have lacked 
two fundamental preconditions for the emergence and 
effectiveness of new modes of governance: state and 
nonstate actors with sufficient resources to engage 
in nonhierarchical coordination to improve the effec-
tiveness of public policy. This “governance capacity” 
has been largely taken for granted by the governance 
literature since it has almost exclusively focused on 
Western democracies.
 The book is organized into ten chapters – four 
more general theoretical-comparative chapters written 
by Tanja Börzel, and six chapters on the accession of 
selected accession countries and in particular Greece, 
written by Charalampos Koutalakis; Portugal, written 
by Ana Mar Fernández and Nuria Font; Spain, written 
by Nuria Font and Ana Mar Fernández; Hungary, writ-
ten by Aron Buzogány; Poland, written by Sonja Gut-
tenbrunner; and Romania, written by Aron Buzogány.
The Introductory chapter, written by Tanja A. Börzel, 
lays out the structure of the book and positions the 
comparative research project within the new forms of 
governance literature. The first chapter, “New Modes 
of Governance and Accession: The Paradox of Double 
Weakness” by Tanja A. Börzel, introduces the empiri-
cal puzzle and the theoretical challenge it poses to the 
literature on (new modes of) governance. The second 
chapter, Environmental Policy and the Challenge of 
Accession, written again by Tanja A. Börzel, discusses 
the specific challenges that accession countries face 
in adopting and adapting to the acquis communautaire 
in the field of environmental policy. It also explains the 
research design of the empirical study and provides 
the analytical framework that guides the comparative 
case studies.
 The six empirical chapters systematically re-
veal and compare how southern European and CEE 
countries coped with the challenge of accession and 
the problems that they faced in adopting and adapt-
ing to the acquis communautaire. The country studies 
on Spain, Portugal and Greece, as well as on Poland, 
Hungary and Romania find very limited empirical evi-
dence for the emergence of new modes of governance 
in both the southern as well as the eastern enlarge-
ment process at the time of accession. The capacities 
of Poland, Hungary and Romania have been weaker 
than those of their southern counterparts in the 1980s. 
New modes of governance have emerged only spo-
radically in situations where state actors possessed 
sufficient capacities to remain in charge of the policy 
process. These new modes of governance hardly went 
beyond consultation with stakeholders and delegation 
of technical tasks. 
 In the concluding chapter, Tanja A. Börzel sum-
marizes the major findings of the comparative case 
studies and discusses their implications for the litera-
ture on (new modes of) governance. 
 This book is an important contribution for two 
reasons. First, it provides the first systematic com-
parison of southern and eastern enlargement from the 
perspective of candidate countries. The authors have 
used a unified analytical approach which raises the 
comparability level and increases the intellectual ap-
peal of the book. Second, the book makes an important 
theoretical contribution to the underdeveloped field of 
new modes of governance in the context of European 
integration. The authors argue that the “shadow of 
hierarchy” has a crucial impact on the incentives for 
both public and private actors to engage in nonhierar-
chical coordination and helps to explain why so little 
evidence was found by the study on new modes of 
governance in accession countries. This “governance 
capacity” has largely been taken for granted by the 
governance literature since it has almost exclusively 
focused on western democracies.
 In sum, I find this book to be a valuable em-
pirical and theoretical addition to the literature on new 
modes of governance. I would highly recommend it to 
both academic scholars and students of European in-
tegration, and to practitioners and policy makers from 
the region.
Elena Iankova
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